If it be argued (that from the acceptance of Brahman as the cause of the universe) arises the defect of the (Samkhya) Smritis being left without any scope, then not so, for otherwise will arise the defect of other Smritis losing their scope.
But this is only a reference to the presiding deities, because of the mention of distinction (between the sentient deities and the insentient organs and elements) and the inherence (of these deities in them).
Since in dissolution there is the predicament of the cause becoming just like that effect, therefore this (theory that Brahman is the material cause) becomes incongruous.
If it be argued that although reasoning is inconclusive, still it has to be done in a different way, (so as to avoid this defect), then even so there will be no getting away from the defect.
If it be argued that the distinction between the experiencer (of happiness and sorrow) and the things experienced will cease when the (experienced) objects turn into the experiencer, then we say that such a distinction can well exist as observed in common experience.
If it be argued that the effect did not exist before creation, since it is declared (in the Upanishad) as "non-existent", then we say, no, because from the complementary portion it is known that the word is used from the standpoint of a difference of characteristics.
If it be said that (Brahman) cannot be the cause, since one is noticed to procure materials (for the production of an object), then we say, no, for it is possible on the analogy of milk.
ॐ कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ॐ ॥ २.१.२७॥
ॐ krtsnaprasaktirniravayavatvasabdakopo va ॐ || 2.1.27||
(If Brahman changes into the world, then) there will arise the contingency of either wholesale transformation or the violation of the texts about partlessness.
If it be argued that it is not possible (to take Karma - merit and demerit - into consideration in the beginning), since the fruits of work remain still undifferentiated, then we say, no, since the transmigratory state has no beginning.